What Is Ethnonationalism And Its Political Role Politics Essay

What Is Ethno micklealism And Its Political social function Politics EssayThe conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 coincides with the flush of violent cultivated negates and the break of nations based on ethno home(a)ism. The 1990s witnessed a new surge of violent civil actions and the splintering of cultural wars (graph). Dan Smith, manager of the International Peace Research Institution in Oslo (PRIO), has calcu easyd that of the 52 armed contravenes of various sizes that took place in 42 some(prenominal)ises in 1993, 36, in 30 states, had ethno-national characteristics that is, at lest integrity side could be place as rifleing to a clear social gathering (Tishkov 200472). The shape ethnonationalism refers to a politicized group affiliation based on inherent singularitys culturality, race, clan, tribe, paganal heritage or organized religion that define a group of individuals in the minds of its members. Ethnonationalist strength should not surprise, went the common refrain, as they ar based on primordial compassionate emotions and centuries of explanation. There may be a breakage were the individuals primeval indistinguishability and eitheregiance shifts from the civil state to the ethnonation. This shift may or may not issuing in violent conflict. As of 2000, fewer than 10% of the gentlemans 191 nations be culturalally or racially homogenized (Wright 1973158).Such conflicts may involve bully fierceness, such(prenominal)(prenominal) as Bosnia and Rwanda crimson in separate cases there is little violence, such as blue Ireland. Ethnonationalism violent conflicts also occur inside formal democracy, for example, the struggle betwixt Catholics and Protestants in Yankee Ireland (Slack and Doyon 2001139).EthnonationalismThe roots of modern nationalism can be found in late eighteenth-century Western Europe and North America, and it afterwardwards spread to all of Europe and as yettually to all parts of the world (Alter 199418). paganity is the some central and designerful element in the development of nationalism. Ethnonationalism denotes some(prenominal) the commitment to a nation deprived of its k right offlight-emitting diodege state and the loyalty to an heathen group embodied in a specific state, in peculiar(prenominal) where the latter is conceived as a nation-state (Connor 1994?). Ethnonationalist believe nationality is inherent, one can neither acquire it if one does not scram it, nor change it if one does it has nothing to do with individual will, and constitutes a genetic characteristic (Guibernau and Rex 20105). Ethnonationalism is grow in a sense of common origins, mainly ancestral, as manifested in sh ard linguistic, spiritual, and racial marker (Riggs 1994599).Nationalism is delineate as an extensive aggregation of individuals closely associated with each(prenominal) early(a) by common descent, words or history, as to form a distinct race or people (Slack Doyon 20 01). Nation by the latter definition becomes equivalent to social group. Nation is a matter of self-aw areness or self-consciousness (Connor 1978104). This is precisely wherefore it is so delicate to define nation, because it is a self-defining group. Nationalism arises when the members of a nation demand that the nation be boned into a soereign state (Slack and Doyon 2001140). The essence of nationalism is not tangible, tho psychological, a matter of strength rather than fact (Connor 197242). MORE ON PAGE 43. Nationalism is probable to be based on heathen distinctions, rather than the idea that everyone who lives in a country is entitled to the similar rights and privileges (Guibernau and Rex 201096 Reader). Allegations of heathen supremacy, along with ethnonationalism and retribution for past in ripeices, are at the center of much of the heathenish violence (Cozic 199493). The causes and implications of heathenishal conflict are chthonianstood as a dispute active im portant political, stinting, social, cultural or territorial issues amongst ii or more ethnic groups (Guibernau and Rex 201090).Ethnicity relates to the identification of individuals by lecture, religion, geographic location, the sharing of common historical experience, or various other elements. social rank of the group is based on the presumption of a shared trait or traits that can be eachthing from genealogy to dressing habits (Slack Doyon 2001140). An ethnic group is therefore defined by a boundary ascribed by the members of the ethnic group or come forthsider.There is a distinction surrounded by primary and secondary ethnic groups (Riggs 1994592). Riggs asserts that primary ethnic groups t curiosity to function as closed sub-societies within a larger soldiery society, whereas secondary ethnic groups, while maintaining their cultural identity, move promptly in a host society at various levels (1994592). In modem states members of primary ethnic communities all ev eryplacelook in the state where they live as a basis for their self-identity, whereas members of secondary ethnic communities accept the state (Riggs 1994592). Problems arise in both cases but they are different (Riggs 1994592). Members of a primary ethnic community feel equal prisoners and they seek to escape the confines of the state (Riggs 1994592). This leads them to rebel, to seek indecorum, indep abateence, or nuclear fusion reaction with another state by boundary changes (Riggs 1994593). The members epitomize ethnonationalism. By line of descent members of a secondary ethnic community a great deal feel that although they are unfairly treated by the state, it is possible by quiet factor to secure full equality of precondition as citizens in all matters involving political, social and scotch justice (Riggs 1994593). Their sense of grievance frequently leads to political action and non-violent protests or civil disobedience, but not to rebellions (Riggs 1994593).Conflic t tends to go forth when ethnic or national identities are in opposition to each other. Additionally, mingled with 1918 and 1945, nationalism became synonymous with intolerance, inhumanity and violence (Cozic 199419). Most ethnic conflicts afford a background of domination, injustice or oppression by one ethnic group or another (Wright 1993158). Although ethnic conflict is viewed as a strife based on religion, economic inequality, political, language, or another tangible element, the conflict is fundamentally based on identity which manifests itself in the us-them syndrome (Connor 196746). The ethnic conflict could escalate into ethic race murder.According to Riggs (1994) nigh 130 million individuals have been slain surrounded by 1900 and 1987 as a result of racial extermination committed by government activitys on their own people. umteen times more people are killed in racial extermination and hatful murder than in all foreign and domestic wars (Riggs 1994583). While to the gamyest degree of the deaths reported by Riggs probably cannot be attributed to ethnonational conflicts, however, it is reasonable to presume that ethnic conflict has been an important factor in many a(prenominal) of them.Democracies provide minorities with opportunities for non-violent materialisation of grievance. Minorities believe they can gain more legitimacy through peaceful political action than by violent rebellions or scourgeism. Conversely, in shaky authoritarian politicss, where minorities are suppressed and ofttimes killed, some will organize rebellions, feeling that solitary(prenominal) by violence will they gain the autonomy needed to protect their interests. Riggs offers the complementary finding that genocide occurs virtually often in non-democratic states, whereas democracies are far more non-violent. Among the 169 million victims of democide during the 20th century, Riggs claims that only ab break through 2 million were inflicted on their citizens by d emocratic states (1994). Of the 167 million, over 110 million took place under communist regimes, about 138 in totalitarian states and well over 28 million under authoritarianism. (Riggs 1994584). Ethnonational rebellions, therefore, have several(prenominal) dimensions they often combine revolt against oppression by antagonistic but dominate communities with the need to create enclaves of order in a context of disorder (Riggs 1994584).The Troubles (1968-1998)The conflict of the Troubles dates back the 1600s when Britain began colonizing Ireland, it encouraged Protestants from Scotland and English, to move to blue Ireland to help maintain and control the Irish Catholics (Healey 2006). The new arrivals began, with the assistance of the English, to own much of the economy, political structures, and land in the northern region of Ireland. The Protestants began to spot themselves from the native Catholics through policies implemented to create separate facilities within the comparabl e society for the use of a minority group, similar to Jim Crow separationism in the United States. Difference in laws and customs amid Protestants and Catholics were employ to reinforce the subordinate position of the Irish Catholics. However, the Irish were not subordinated and tackle to gain their independence through violent rebellions, which ultimately led to their independents. The easterly Rebellion in 1916, also known as the Proclamation of 1916, led to creation of the Republic of Ireland (Healey 2006). The Republic of Ireland consisted of most of the island, except the providence of Ulster. Now, blue Ireland consisted of Protestant pack and the Republic of Ireland consisted of Catholic majority, which provided the underlying basis for the Trouble.In Federal Ireland, Catholic and Protestant are terms use to inculpate two diverse and conflicting cultures (Shivers and Bowmen 19843). Distinguishing factors between the two are internal, the expressive style one views o neself. However, Most people in Northern Ireland insist that the civic conflict that occurred was not because of religion but sovereignty not Protestantism but Loyalism not Catholicism but Nationalism or Republicanism (Vincent 127). Protestant majority and Catholic minority in Northern Ireland is another way of distinguishing between the two groups. There is no distinct term to explain the minority-majority spilt, but Northern Irish people have use many other terms Insiders/Outsiders the haves/the have nots colonials/natives Scotch/Gales Protestant/Catholic Unionist/ superpatriotic Loyalist/Republican British/Irish the Orange/the Green (Shivers and Bowmen 19844). The attempts by Catholic minority to express through the electoral process their long-standing discontentment with political rule by a religiously and culturally distinct people, as well as the attempts of the castigate government to move toward equalization of opportunity for the minority, resulted in a series of viole nt reactions during 1966, and untimely the inception of the Troubles (Connor 196712).The struggle predicated on fundamental differences in national identity. The people of Northern Ireland did not homogeneously consider themselves Irish. In a study conducted in 1968 by the University of Strathcylde, 43 percent considered themselves Irish, 29 percent British, 21 percent Ulster, and 7 percent mixed, uncertain, or mixed (Connor 196745). On the basis of ethnic and religious history in Northern Ireland, there is a correlation coefficient between those that identify themselves as Irish and Catholicism (Connor 196745).McGarry and OLeary (1995) interpret religion as an ethnic marker, a component of ethnonationalism in Northern Ireland, the conflict is about two contesting national identities, Unionist (Protestant) and Nationalist (Catholic). faith is just a label used to distinguish members of one ethnonationalist group from another. devotion was used as the basis of separate social stru ctures that keep communities apart. Whyte (1990) wrote about the three ways in whichreligion and social segregation were seen in Northern Ireland segregation by religion in education, high levels of exogamy (marriage within ones religious group), and high levels of residential segregation.The churches worked together with the political parties and the two states, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, to keep people divided and maintain their forcefulness (Fulton 1991). Religion has acted as an agent in historical struggles for political power (Fulton 1991). Churches tried to keep their control through influencing political policy and maintaining their spellbind on the education system.According to Wright (1973), religion as an ideology is passing important. Religion was an important source of identity in Northern Ireland, unconstipated for Protestants who do not go to church (Wright 1973). Religion can escape as an ideology even for those who are not committed believers (Wright 1973).Religion is important in many complex ways it provides meaning and nubble to ethnonational identities (Mitchell 2006). Religious ideas inform Protestants everyday understandings of social relationships and perceptions of Catholics (Wright 1973). The more segregation between communities, the less information each has of the other. Knowledge comes from socialized teachings, ideas, theories, and mythologies, which are often religious in nature (Wright 1973).Religious ideas overlap with political and economic divisions and this makes them even more important.Religion, according to Claire Mitchell (2006), derives social and political significance from cardinal overlapping dimensions 1) relationship between the churches and sociopolitical power (i.e. relationships with nationalist and unionist politicians), 2) consumption of religion as the dominant ethnic marker (maintained through unintegrated education, marriage, housing patterns and social networks),3) religions role in the construction of communities (esp. Catholicism, the role of the Catholic Church in organising social life and the importance of ritual), 4) religions role in the construction of ideologies (esp. Protestantism, concepts such as liberty, the honest Ulsterman, and anti-Catholicism), and 5) relationship between god and politics (esp. for fundamentalists/evangelicals).The essence of nation being is psychologically important. Members of a particular group feel a sense of being related to one another, or of myths of being from a common descendent. The turmoil in Northern Ireland between those who think of themselves as Irish and those who do not is facilely explained as a religious struggle, no other readily identifiable distinction, such as language or race, being in evidence (Connor 1984146).Ethnonational inequality does occur in a given state, for example, in Northern Ireland contrariety is a major element in the poorer economic and occupational status of the Irish as contrast with the non-Irish (Connor1984148).The Good Friday Agreement marked the end of the Troubles, which was established in 1998, created a new power sharing bargain for the governance in Northern Ireland (Healey 2006). Thus, both Protestant and Catholic parties would participate in the government.The Bosnian War (1992-1995)Yugoslavia was formed in 1918, at the end of World War I (Healey 2006479). The country consists of a variety of ethnic groups, including Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, and Muslims. In 1974 Josip Broz Tito turned Yugoslavia into a confederation of six republics, one of which was Bosnia and Herzegovina (Slack and Doyon 2001142). Bosnia was the most diverse republic, often described as a microcosm of the Balkans, a human mosaic made up of the genes of innumerable (Slack and Doyon 2001141). Before this the Muslims have never been able to assert themselves as a distinct ethnic group, with aspirations of statehood, as have the Croats and Serbs (Slack and Doyon 2001141). As a con sequence of the newly formed republics, Muslims were breathing out to be the dominant group in Bosnia. During the time that Yugoslavia was led by Tito, Roman Catholic Croats, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Muslim Bosnians coexisted peacefully in Bosnia.However, following Titos death in 1980, Yugoslavia began to be breakup. While the Croats tended to view Yugoslavia as a decentralized federation, the Serbs were espoused to a highly centralized system (Slack and Doyon 2001142). With Bosnias drug withdrawal from Yugoslavia in 1992, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs suddenly became apart of the ethnic minorities in the new state of Bosnia instead of being members of the dominant Croat and Serb nations within Yugoslavia. The tribe Bosnia in 1991 consisted of Bosnian Muslims (1.9 million, 44% of all), Serbs (1.4 million, 31%), Bosnian Croats (760,000), 17%, and Others (all rest ethnicities jointly 350,000, 8%) (Tabeaui and Bijaki 2005188).Demographic conditions can lead to ethno nationalist war when ethnonationalism becomes a political force (Slack and Doyon 2001159). The relative numbers of rival ethnic universes within a disputed territory becomes an issue of concern for a civil war. Bosnian Serbs, and later also Bosnian Croats, fought (often through ethnic cleanup and terror ranges) to take and control territories that differently would be subject to the rule of Bosnian Muslims. Ethnic conflict takes place when mobilized identity groups struggle for great power, whether for power in an already established state or a newly independent state. In 1991, the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic began to increase the control condition of Serbs in the motive Yugoslavia, particularly in three republics, Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia, felt directly threatened by Serb nationalism and the perspective of Greater Serbia carved out of the territories mainly in Bosnia (Tabeaui and Bijaki 2005188). The Muslims fought for these territories, as they believed they did not have much choice. disruption away from Yugoslavia put Bosnian Muslims in a particularly difficult position, as they were left with no support other than the one anticipate from the international community, which came in April 1992, however, it did not stop the Bosnian conflict (Tabeaui and Bijaki 2005189). delinquent to the mixed ethnic composition of Bosnia, there was an absence of a individual ethnic Muslim republic in the antecedent Yugoslavia. The most all-important(a) observation of the Bosnian population at the outbreak of the 1990s conflict is that while there were Bosnians in a geographical sense, there were exactly any Bosnians in a political sense. Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats existed as politically distinct groups who happened to live in Bosnia (Tabeaui and Bijaki 2005188). Political goals of these groups were too distinct to forgo for coexistence. Serbs, and later also Croats, fought, often through ethnic cleansing and terror campaigns, to take and contr ol of Bosnia (Tabeaui and Bijaki 2005188).The conflicts were not religious wars, but religion and language were important tools of ethnic identification, ethnonationalism. In an effort to distinguish the other the ethnic groups stressed subtle differences among the languages. Located in the heart of the former-Yugoslavia, Bosnia found itself locked between two more powerful states, Croatia and Serbia. The wars caused the most destruction in Bosnia, as the country contains sizeable Croat and Serb populations.The 1990 elections, is an example of growing ethnonationalism in Bosnia, members of each ethnic group voted in the 1990 election along ethnic nationalist lines, even though they were unimpressed with the party leaders, out of fear that ethnic groups to which they did not belong would gain political ascendancy (Slack and Doyon 2001143). The political construction of ethnonationalism had now begun, and Bosnia was beginning to partition. The Territorial partitions can lead to renewe d violence and mass refugee flows, entail an indefinite international peacekeeping presence, and paradoxically can result in new sets of sectarian demands (Wood 200170). An imposed partition only rarely results in a homogeneous territory and often leads to civic wars.gestural at the end of the war, the Dayton Agreement was more of a ceasefire agreement than a sustainable, long-term solution for Bosnia. According to this agreement signed in declination 1995, Bosnia is a partitioned state divided into two parts. One entity is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority of Muslims and Croat population, and the other entity is Republika Srpska, almost entirely populated by Serbs (Tabeaui and Bijaki 2005189). The borders were decided by the frontlines when the wars ended, resulting in the formation of ethnic enclaves. The three dominant ethnic groups, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, are represented in all levels of government thus creating pleonastic personnel and slow refor m. The country has three presidents, one from each group, and a parliament in which Croats, Serbs and Muslims each have a third of seats. Furthermore, many politicians gain votes in elections through ethnonationalist campaigns that appeal to their own ethnic and religious group. The entire government reports to a High Representative, who is appointed largely by the international community and will remain in Bosnia for an undetermined time.Since the wars, the population of Bosnia in 2009 was 4.6 million according to the CIA World Factbook. Muslims comprise 48% of the population, Serbs are 37% and Croats are 14%. Religious demographics strongly reflect ethnic demographics in the population of Bosnia, with 40% Muslim, 31% Orthodox, and 15% Roman Catholic. With such a strong connection between religion and ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that religion became an important tool of identification of ethnonationalism during and after the wars.Rwanda (1994)While Rwan das two ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis, experienced a long history of hatred, the conflict escalated in April 1994 when a plane carrying the Hutu President of Rwanda was shot megabucks over the capital, Kigali (Healey 2006). The suspicious deaths of the presidents of Rwanda triggered a sudden and massive bloodletting, primarily by Hutus against Tutsis (Wood 200160). An estimated 5-10 per cent of Rwandas population was then killed between the second workweek of April and the third week of May 1994 one of the highest casualty rates of any population in history from non-natural causes (Hintjens 1999241-2). In all roughly 800,000 people were killed, and millions fled Rwanda (Healey 2006).The history of Tutsi and Hutu over the past century is one in which conventional ethnic roles were continually manipulated, fuelling hostility and making recurring mass violence all but inevitable (Wood 200164). Colonization and conquest helped fuel the already intense ethnic conflict between the Tu tsis and Hutus in what is now Rwanda (Healey 2006). Traditionally, Tutsis had been the rulers over the Hutus. By 1400, Europeans nations began colonizing Africa, and Germany had established control over the region, which possessed Rwanda, in the late 1800s (Healey 2006). In an attempted to administer and control Rwanda, Germany put the Tutsis in a position to govern the Hutus. The case of divide and rule, further perpetrated the hostility between the two ethnic groups (Healey 2006480). After Germanys defeat in WWI, Belgium took control over the region, and continued the tradition of the political and economic differentials between the two tribes (Healey 2006480). compound support shifted toward Hutus in the 1950s and, by Rwandas independence from Belgium in 1962, a new generation of Hutu leaders were able to turn against the Tutsis, expelling several hundred thousand to nigh Burundi and Uganda (Wood 200162). In 1969, two nations were established in the region Burundi, which was dom inated by Tutsis, and Rwanda, which was dominated by Hutus (Healey 2006).The Rwanda jingoistic Front (RPF), led by Tutsi, had been waging an increasingly successful war since its 1990 offensive against the Hutu-dominated government of President Habyarimana (Wood 200160). His government had managed to control ethnic violence in the 1980s and had been pursuing power-sharing talks with the RPF that culminated in the August 1993 Arusha Accords (Wood 200160). At the same time, though, he had also cracked down on political opponents, including moderate Hutus, and had begun to incite violence against Tutsis (Wood 200160). An October 1993 Tutsi military coup against the predominantly Hutu government of neighboring Burundi heightened paranoia among Rwandan Hutus (Wood 200160). Up to and during the April-July 1994 genocide, the RPF continued to take territory away from government troops and finally ousted the government (Wood 200160). Hutu militia (known as the Interahamwe originally a gove rnment-sponsored youth movement became an armed anti-Tutsi force in the early 1990s) hunt down Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Wood 200160). The Interahamwe ideology behind the government supported genocide painted Tutsis as an invading force from the north. This inaccurate caricature was built by colonial rulers who favoured the Tutsis as natural born leaders, racially headmaster to Hutus, and imposed ethnic identity cards, thereby aggravating a tightly controlled political system and an economically interdependent society (Wood 200172).Officials of the authoritarian regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana, felt as if their power was diminishing so they used their monopoly of media to create a finely tuned propaganda machine that played on Hutu fears of the former Tutsi elite and purveyed false, versions of the history of relations between the two groups (Snyder and Ballentine 199630). In April 1994, the Hutu official group unleashed militias trained in the techniques of genocide. At the same time, Radio-T6levision Libre des Mille Collines, a pseudo-private station established by Habyarimanas wife, announced that Tutsi rebels were about to rise up and kill Hutu, and consequently that all Hutu should join the militias in a campaign of preventive killing (Snyder and Ballentine 199630).Unlike Bosnia, where ethnic cleansing dragged on for several years, the genocidal frenzy in Rwanda lasted about three months (Wood 200160). Exhorted by government-sponsored hate broadcasts and leaflets, and often led by officials, many Hutus turned on their Tutsi neighbors with a vengeance. For the most part, Hutu mobs had free reign to shoot, hack, and beat to death men, women, and children hiding in their homes, churches, hospitals, and even orphanages (Wood 200161). Many Tutsi women were raped before being killed and many children, as a means of degrading and terrorizing Tutsi communities. Interahamwe leaders carefully planned the genocide, provided weapons, compiled lists of impo rtant Tutsis, and went to each commune to ensure that killings were thoroughly carried out (Wood 200161).The ideology behind Rwandas genocide evolved amidst harsh conditions of poverty, arable land scarcity, and income inequity (Wood 200164). Theories of racial struggles and hierarchy evoke during the time of economic struggle. In the mid 1980s the price of drinking chocolate dropped (Hintjens 1999). The export of coffee and tea has been important in the region (Healey 2006). As a result of the economic drop, the search began for a scapegoat and the decline became another reason for genocide. In Rwanda conspiracy theories and myths were used to justify genocide. In an impoverished ethnocratic state like Rwanda, ethnicity is also the ruling principle of economic and social differentiation, with ethnic groups then forced to confront each other in the process of competition for material and social resources (Markakis 1993, 236). Such demography-linked pressures as shrinking farm siz e (an average of less than 1 hectare) and high fertility rates (with a population doubling time of under 20 years and a young population age structure), as well as a stagnant economy, helped increase tensions between Rwandas 7.8 million Hutus and Tutsis (Wood 200164). Nationalism in effect attempts to squeeze an idealized grouping of otherwise disparate people into a territorially defined state (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). Ethnic segregation through the division of artificially bounded political units becomes a requirement for the preservation of a groups threatened identity and thus a matter of life and death. (Wood 200163).Comparative AnalyzeIn both Rwanda and Bosnia, the genocides have been part of an overall socio-economic collapse that has left its perpetrators financially much worse off than they were before. Genocidists justified their actions through an ideological than an economic view of national greatness, while exploiting difficult living conditions to scapegoat minoriti es (Wood 200164). In addition, they initiate genocidal measures in peripheral areas of the redefined living space some of the most brutal violence took place in the rural peripheries of northern and eastern Bosnia, eastern Croatia, northwestern United States Rwanda, and eastern Congo (Wood 200164). At the same time, genocidists can go to great lengths to crush heterogeneous and thus politically suspect enclaves within the cultural core of an endlessly purifying homeland (Wood 200165).In both Bosnia and Rwanda, the fighter aircraft ethnic groups speak the same language and most Tutsis and Hutus even belong to the same religion. Political leaders in both areas exaggerated perceive ethnic differences and old grievances (Wood 200165). They also manipulated violence-inciting propaganda, such as broadcasts by Rwandas notorious Radio Mille Collines describing Tutsis as cockroaches (Wood 200165).While not the grand territorially defined strategy that it was in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing wa s also the goal of Rwandan genocidists. In Rwanda the mechanics of ethnic cleansing were simpler than in Bosnia. Tutsis and some moderate Hutus were killed on the spot or rounded up (either encouraged or forced) in convenient locales, usually church and school compounds, and then massacred by the thousands (Wood 200168). besides like Bosnia and other twentieth century genocides, ethnic cleansing could not be contained within Rwanda (Wood 200168).Bosnia and Rwanda, two radically different geographic contexts, are testimony to how dormant ethnic mistrust and fear can be manipulated into a swift genocidal eruption (Wood 200172). In an increasingly heterogeneous world, genocide will remain a fundamental international security threat. (Wood 200172). key to the process of the Bosnian war is the concept of ethnonationalism. The Bosnian war arose out of the collapse of totalitarian control of territory producing a political rescind that, in turn, exposes a deep-rooted rivalry between ethn ic groups leading to a struggle for control of territory ending in an attempt at violent resolution (Slack Doyon 2001140).Conclusion